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Abstract
Data flow analysis techniques can be used to help as-
sess threats to data confidentiality and integrity in
security-critical program code. However, a fundamen-
tal weakness of static analysis techniques is that they
overestimate the ways in which data may propagate
at run time. Discounting large numbers of these false-
positive data flow paths wastes an information secu-
rity evaluator’s time and effort. Here we show how to
automatically eliminate some false-positive data flow
paths by precisely modelling how classified data is
blocked by certain expressions in embedded C code.
We present a library of detailed data flow models
of individual expression elements and an algorithm
for introducing these components into conventional
data flow graphs. The resulting models can be used
to accurately trace byte-level or even bit-level data
flow through expressions that are normally treated as
atomic. This allows us to identify expressions that
safely downgrade their classified inputs and thereby
eliminate false-positive data flow paths from the se-
curity evaluation process. To validate the approach
we have implemented and tested it in an existing data
flow analysis toolkit.
Keywords: Security-critical software; Data flow anal-
ysis; Taint analysis; Embedded programs; Downgrad-
ing
1 Introduction
Data flow analysis is a method of examining a sys-
tem and how its constituents interact with each other.
These interactions are embodied in the flows of data
contained within the system, with the meaning of a
flow depending on the type of system being analysed:
for hardware it may represent the path of an electri-
cal signal, while for software it may show that a par-
ticular value influences the output of a computation.
Founded on the lattice model of secure information
flow (Denning 1976), secure data flow analysis makes
use of this technique to enforce or verify a system’s
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security. Static analysis of data flow through security-
critical program code, sometimes called ‘taint’ analy-
sis, is relevant to protecting both data confidentiality
and data integrity (Pistoia et al. 2007).
Several secure data flow analysis systems target-
ing software can be found in the literature (Suh et al.
2004, Newsome & Song 2005, Myers 1999, Song et al.
2008), but they all share a significant problem: the
security classes of expressions are determined en-
tirely from the security classes of their inputs; the
expression’s behaviour is not taken into considera-
tion. This problem stems from the lattice model of
secure information flow (Denning 1976) where the se-
curity class of a function f(a1, . . . , an) is equal to
the least upper bound of the input security classes,
i.e., the least security class greater-than or equal-to
all input security classes for parameters a1 to an.
This definition means that downgrading expressions
(Li & Zdancewic 2005)—through which data may
safely flow from a high-security domain to a low-
security domain—cannot be recognised, leading to
false-positive errors (Newsome et al. 2009) in which
the analysis system states that a permissible flow is
impermissible. For example, the security class of ex-
pression ‘secret * 0’ is equal to that of classified
variable secret, even though we can learn nothing
about this integer’s value from the expression’s con-
stant output.
Data flow analyses are important for information
security, or ‘infosec’, evaluations of the kind per-
formed by Australia’s Defence Signals Directorate
in its Australasian Information Security Evaluation
Programme1. This programme evaluates information
technology products against the Common Criteria
for Information Technology Security Evaluation (ISO
2009) so that consumers of security-critical hardware
and software can make informed procurement deci-
sions, especially for government or military purposes.
Most of these evaluations concern embedded systems,
i.e., machines with limited resources, running soft-
ware whose primary purpose is to interact with the
physical world (Lee 2002). To accommodate these
resource constraints, embedded software makes fre-
quent use of bitwise operations to pack and unpack
values from sub-byte sections of memory, meaning
the security classes of data are often determined at
the level of individual binary digits. Embedded pro-
gram code analyses are thus particularly susceptible
to false-positive errors because downgrading expres-
sions may go unrecognised.
The work of ‘infosec evaluators’ of embedded sys-
tems can be supported by automated tools that iden-
tify potential data flow paths worthy of detailed inves-
tigation. One such tool is SIFA, the Secure Informa-
tion Flow Analyser (McComb & Wildman 2005), in
1http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/aisep/
which graph representations of security-critical elec-
tronic circuitry may be developed and analysed in
various ways (McComb & Wildman 2007), especially
to identify data flow paths. As an extension to this
tool, we recently produced a ‘C-to-SIFA Converter’,
a compiler-like tool that produces SIFA-compatible
data flow graphs of C code running on embedded mi-
crocontrollers. This tool, combined with SIFA, pro-
vides automated support for data flow analyses of
both the hardware and software of security-critical
embedded devices (Mills et al. 2012).
However, the data flow analyses performed by the
C-to-SIFA Converter follow the traditional approach
of treating each operation in a program code expres-
sion as atomic, thus failing to recognise potentially-
downgrading expressions (Li & Zdancewic 2005). Our
aim here, therefore, is to reduce the number of false-
positive data flow paths generated during analysis of
embedded software. To achieve this we (1) developed
a library of detailed data flow models of C operators
for different data representations, (2) devised an algo-
rithm for inserting these models into a given data flow
graph, (3) implemented the library and algorithm as
an add-on module for the C-to-SIFA Converter, and
(4) used case studies to confirm that the new module
improved SIFA’s ability to trace data flow through
security-critical embedded software.
2 Related and previous work
Our concern is with analysing the way classified data
may be transferred through expressions in embedded
program code, with the aim of recognising expressions
that successfully downgrade classified data. Here we
review related and previous work from the areas of
secure data flow analysis, program code certification,
and embedded system certification.
2.1 Secure data flow analysis
In general, data flows may be identified either by
examining a system’s construction—statically—or by
observing its behaviour—dynamically. Here we are
interested in static analysis only; information about
dynamic analysis for protecting data security can be
found elsewhere (Suh et al. 2004, Newsome & Song
2005).
Many practical static data flow analysis systems
are presented in the literature (Myers 1999, Song
et al. 2008) but unfortunately they all generate false-
positive errors (Newsome et al. 2009). Our goal is to
help reduce this problem by developing a technique
to precisely trace data flows through expressions, al-
lowing downgrading expressions, i.e., those that pro-
duced unclassified outputs from classified inputs (Li
& Zdancewic 2005), to be recognised.
Secure data flow analysis is founded upon the lat-
tice model of secure information flow presented by
Denning (1976). Explicit and implicit flows of data
are differentiated, with the former occurring when
data is transferred directly from one object to an-
other, as in assignment statements, and the latter
when execution of an explicit flow is controlled by an-
other expression, such as when an assignment occurs
within a conditional statement. For program code
analysis Volpano, Smith & Irvine (1996) express this
concept as a type-inference system and mathemati-
cally prove its soundness as a form of noninterference
(Goguen & Meseguer 1982). These principles can be
implemented as a static program code analysis (Pis-
toia et al. 2007) to trace the flow of security-critical
data.
Importantly, however, static analyses can only
identify potential data flows, many of which may
never actually occur at run time. They thus over-
estimate the flow of data, producing false-positive re-
sults which waste the security evaluator’s time and
effort, motivating our interest in more precise analy-
sis of code expressions.
In closely related work, Newsome et al. (2009) in-
troduced a concept of influence which quantifies “how
much” of a computation’s inputs affect its output.
They propose that security policies make use of this
property, providing the example rule of “data influ-
enced by x or more bits by the network may not be
loaded into the program counter.” However, this con-
cept is also susceptible to false-positive errors because
it is not known exactly which bits of the output are
affected by the inputs; this makes it impossible to
trace the original inputs through subsequent opera-
tions that remove data. For example, if we know that
a value x has 4 bits of influence over another value y,
and half of y is removed, it cannot be determined how
many bits of x remain. Our goal is instead to trace
the flow of individual bytes or even bits precisely.
Another highly relevant area of previous work is
research into how information can flow through ar-
rays in high-level languages. For instance, it has been
observed that as well as an array’s contents, its length
and the indices at which certain values appear in the
array can encode information (Deng & Smith 2004).
More importantly, there has also been research into
how to accurately trace the flow of classified informa-
tion through specific array elements (Rus et al. 2007),
rather than treating the array as atomic, which causes
insertion of a single classified element to ‘taint’ the
whole array. This research is obviously closely related
to our own since all variables in computer programs
can be modelled as arrays of bits. In fact, the prob-
lem we face in analysing embedded software is simpler
than the general case for arrays because embedded
code expressions make frequent use of hardwired con-
stants, so we can often tell statically exactly which
bits are affected by an operation, while this is ex-
tremely difficult for symbolic array indices (Rus et al.
2007).
2.2 Program code security certification
Denning & Denning (1977) build on the lattice model
of permissable data flows (Denning 1976) to present
mechanisms for certifying that a program is secure
based on the flows of data within it; if it contains
any impermissible flows, it could potentially leak sen-
sitive information and is thus insecure. They extend
the lattice model to include arrays, exceptions, and
procedure calls so that these may also be certified
through static analysis of program source code.
Several static and dynamic secure data flow anal-
ysis systems can be found in the literature. One such
system is JFlow (Myers 1999), an extension to the
Java language that adds a number of constructs en-
abling compile-time static analysis. Another system,
BitBlaze (Song et al. 2008), supports both static and
dynamic analysis of binary programs providing they
use one of the several instruction sets supported by
the tool. In our own research we have developed
a static analysis tool for tracing data flow through
security-critical C code in embedded devices (Mills
et al. 2012).
However, all of these systems exhibit the same
problem discussed in the previous section. They fol-
low traditional data flow principles in which opera-
tions in expressions are treated as atomic, which re-
sults in false-positive errors because operations which
block classified data are not recognised as such. To
partially solve this problem, Suh et al. (2004), New-
some & Song (2005) and Song et al. (2008) identify a
set of “constant functions” whose inputs do not affect
their output, providing as an example the instruction
‘xor eax, eax’ which zeros the eax register. If given
security-sensitive inputs, these constant functions be-
come downgrading expressions. It is claimed that all
three systems recognise a subset of these functions,
but the authors do not explicitly state which are sup-
ported. Newsome & Song (2005) note that identifica-
tion of these functions would greatly reduce the num-
ber of false-positive errors generated; this is also our
objective, but our research aims to go further by also
recognising operations that let some data through.
2.3 Embedded system certification
A special case of program code certification involves
analysis of security-critical embedded code, i.e., soft-
ware which interacts directly with its hardware en-
vironment. This is important in the context of in-
ternational standards, such as the Common Criteria
for Information Technology Security Evaluation (ISO
2009), which mandate information security, or ‘in-
fosec’, evaluations of electronic devices intended to
safeguard data in government and military applica-
tions. Within Australia the Defence Signals Direc-
torate follows such standards to produce a list of
trustworthy devices, known as the Evaluated Products
List2. Our own research concerns the need to support
such evaluations by automating data flow analysis of
embedded software in the context of its surrounding
digital circuitry (Mills et al. 2012).
This is challenging because embedded software
typically contains bit-level and byte-level data oper-
ations not normally encountered in application soft-
ware. To overcome memory constraints, embedded
software often makes use of bitwise operations to
pack and unpack data values. These operations may
serve as downgrading expressions, by masking or oth-
erwise eliminating security-critical bits, making em-
bedded software analyses particularly susceptible to
false-positive data flow errors if the function of these
operations is not modelled accurately.
Previous research on automating data flow anal-
ysis of embedded devices produced SIFA, the Secure
Information Flow Analyser, an open-source3 software
tool developed to automate data flow analysis of dig-
ital circuitry (McComb & Wildman 2005). SIFA rep-
resents electronic circuitry as a graph of components,
each of which has a number ports on its periphery.
Inter-component connections can be made by linking
ports on different components, and intra-component
data flow is modelled by defining how data is trans-
ferred between ports on the same component. SIFA
provides a variety of graph-theoretic analysis func-
tions (McComb & Wildman 2007), the most impor-
tant being its ability to identify all data flow paths
between selected ports, usually from a high-security
data source to a low-security data sink.
In our own research we have developed a ‘C-to-
SIFA Converter’, a compiler-like static analyser that
converts embedded C code to SIFA-compatible data
flow graphs that can be integrated into circuitry mod-
els. This capability supports seamless data flow anal-
yses through an embedded device’s hardware and
software (Mills et al. 2012). However, the tool fol-
lows standard data flow graph building principles in
which each operator in an expression is represented
2http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/epl/
3http://sifa.sourceforge.net/
as an atomic component and each program variable
or constant is modelled as a single arc (Scholz et al.
2008).
Thus, our tool also suffers from the inability to
recognise expressions that downgrade classified data
at the bit or byte level. Our goal here, therefore, was
to extend the capabilities of the C-to-SIFA Converter
to give it a more precise ability to analyse data flow
through expressions in embedded C code.
3 The component library
The first part of our solution was to develop a SIFA-
compatible library of data flow components that
model the way data flows through operations in C
expressions precisely. This section discusses the ra-
tionale for the library’s design and presents some rep-
resentative component models.
3.1 Threat model
In designing the library we had to first decide pre-
cisely what was meant by ‘data flow’. The ways in
which information can flow through program expres-
sions can be subtle. For instance, the value of ex-
pression ‘A + B’ tells us nothing about the values of
operands A and B. However, the value of expression
‘A * B’ always reveals whether or not the signs of the
operands were the same. Furthermore, if the expres-
sion’s value is a prime number then we know the ex-
act value of the operands! Rather than entering into
complex deliberations about what information can be
inferred from expression values, we therefore instead
chose to adopt the simple and clear noninterference
model of data flow cited above. Thus, unless it can
be proven otherwise, we conservatively assume that
the values of an expression’s operands all exert some
discernable influence on the expression’s value. Thus,
both operands A and B are assumed to affect the value
of expression ‘A + B’, even though little or nothing
can be learnt about their precise values without addi-
tional information, but the value of expression ‘A * 0’
is assumed to reveal nothing at all about operand A
since constant 0 entirely dominates the result.
This overall argument is based on a scenario in
which the ‘attacker’ of our program has access to its
source code listing and can observe all data emanating
from the embedded device containing the microcon-
troller running the compiled code. This is a worst-
case attacker profile for an embedded security-critical
device, so our model is thus safely conservative, even
though it will sometimes overestimate data flow. (If
the attacker had powers greater than this, e.g., phys-
ical access to the device and the ability to insert de-
bugging probes into the microcontroller to observe
memory or register values, then no defence is possi-
ble.)
3.2 Design process
In order to accurately trace data flow through the
expressions that the C-to-SIFA Converter encounters,
we must first understand how the component parts
of these expressions behave in isolation. As the tool
targets embedded C code, there are several kinds of
expression element, including but not limited to:
• bitwise, logical, and mathematical operators such
as <<, &&, or +,
• calls to built-in and user-defined functions such
as abs() or rand(),
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Figure 1: A component depicting a left-shift by 2.
• identifiers and variables such as PI or x,
• literal values of varying types such as 42 or ‘c’,
and
• type casts such as (int) or (float).
We considered the behaviour of a significant num-
ber of these expression elements under various cir-
cumstances. These ranged from different input types
(e.g., floating-point values) to specific sets of input
values (e.g., powers of two). The results of these stud-
ies were modelled as SIFA components which may be
connected to form data flow graphs modelling entire
expressions. Particular emphasis was put on identify-
ing expression elements that remove data as they have
the potential to be used in downgrading expressions
(Li & Zdancewic 2005).
The C-to-SIFA Converter targets the CCS Em-
bedded C compiler, so this compiler’s reference man-
ual4 was used to determine which expression elements
should be analysed, and to gain a basic understand-
ing of their behaviour. A number of other works were
then consulted to further develop our understanding
of the elements’ behaviour (Tanenbaum et al. 1982,
Seacord 2006). The expression elements were then
translated to SIFA components as explained in Sec-
tion 3.3 below.
Given the vast number of C expression elements
that the tool may encounter, we could model only a
subset of them in the time available for this research
project. We were guided in our choices by some C pro-
gram fragments supplied to the research team by the
Defence Signals Directorate as examples of ‘typical’
software found in security-critical embedded devices
undergoing analysis in the Australasian Information
Security Evaluation Programme. We considered all
bitwise, logical, and mathematical operators, but ex-
cluding assignment operators such as ‘+=’ and ‘|=’
because they can be expanded into two simpler oper-
ations. A subset of standard C library functions and
type casts were also considered. These are the ex-
pression elements most frequently used in embedded
C code encountered by AISEP security evaluators,
and are thus the most likely to cause false positives.
3.3 Expression components
A component—an entry in the component library—
describes the behaviour of a particular expression el-
ement under some circumstance, often for specific in-
put values. The data flow components are represented
4http://www.ccsinfo.com/
in SIFA’s graphical notation as a named collection of
‘ports’. (In fact, SIFA’s graph analysis algorithms
treat a model’s ports as the graph’s nodes, rather
than the components.) An example library compo-
nent for a left-shift by 2 on an 8-bit value is shown in
Figure 1.
A component may have any number of input and
output ports that represent data flowing into and out
of it, respectively. These ports also act as “connection
points” from which inter- or intra-component connec-
tions may be made. Inter-component connections join
the output ports of one component to input ports
of another; it is this type of connection that allows
entire expressions to be modelled using components.
Intra-component connections join input and output
ports of a single component and model the flow of
data through it. Both types of connection depend
on the component’s input and output representations
(Section 3.4), but intra-component connections also
depend on the behaviour of the expression element
being modelled.
To determine what intra-component connections
should be made through a component, we followed
the concept of noninterference, originally defined by
Goguen & Meseguer (1982). Volpano et al. (1996)
provide an alternate definition that is more suited to
our work as it concerns memory and the variables
within it as opposed to the original definition which
considers users and the actions that they may per-
form. Using this concept, if an input port is nonin-
terfering with all output ports, it does not affect the
component’s output and is said to be “removed.” If
an input port may affect an output port however, an
intra-component connection is made between them.
This means that there are situations where an input
port may be connected to several output ports or vice
versa. For example, when performing addition a carry
will occur if two bits of equal significance are both 1,
which may cause another carry and so on.
Literal constant inputs are not compatible with
this definition of removal as they are immutable in
the context of static data flow analysis: they cannot
be changed without modifying the program’s source
code. It is for this reason that entries in the com-
ponent library do not include input ports for literal
values. Were they to be included, they would serve
only to complicate the data flow graph and would
provide no benefit as it is assumed that all “note-
worthy” constants (e.g., the seed of a pseudorandom
number generator used to create encryption keys) will
be named in the source program. (This particular is-
sue was much discussed during development of the C-
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Figure 2: Three of the data representations used in the component library, showing how the individual bits of
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to-SIFA Converter. Ultimately it was decided that in-
formation security evaluators would not usually want
to trace the ‘flow’ of a hardwired constant, although
some provision for this is built into the tool.)
3.4 Data representations
At times it is convenient to explain the behaviour
of an expression element in terms of logical aspects
of values rather than the underlying bits of memory.
For example, it is clearer to say that the absolute-
value function fabs() removes the sign of its operand,
rather than saying the leftmost bit is discarded. Fur-
thermore, to minimise the complexity of the data flow
graphs, we want to avoid tracing every individual bit
through an expression in situations where this does
not provide any helpful information.
Binary Representation
Single Value Representation
Figure 3: An undesirable connection between two rep-
resentations in which a single value (top) connects to
all bits in a binary representation (bottom).
To do this, the inputs and outputs of all compo-
nents in the component library are expressed in par-
ticular representations that map the underlying bits
of values to components’ ports. By mapping certain
groups of bits to a single port, components can effec-
tively operate on logical aspects of values; this lets
us create components for expression elements whose
behaviour would otherwise be prohibitively complex
to analyse. Three of the representations used in the
component library are shown in Figure 2:
• binary representation where each bit is mapped
to its own port,
• sign and magnitude representation where the
sign bit is mapped to one port and the remain-
ing bits (the magnitude) are mapped to another,
and
• single value representation where all bits are
mapped to a single port.
As representations simply map bits to ports, we
can make inter-component connections between any
two representations while maintaining the integrity
needed for data flow analysis. Providing the repre-
sentations have the same underlying data type, this
is achieved by iterating over all bits of the data, and
connecting the ports that represent each bit.
Connections between some representations are un-
desirable, however, as they result in an apparent du-
plication of data that undermines the integrity of the
data flow analysis. This occurs when the first repre-
sentation maps two or more bits to a single port, and
the second representation maps those same bits to a
greater number of ports. This can be seen in Figure 3
where a single value representation is connected to a
binary one. Connecting data representations in this
way is unhelpful because bitwise data flow cannot be
traced through the single value representation.
3.5 Some typical library components
The component library contains data flow compo-
nents for arithmetic operators, comparison and rela-
tional operators, logical operators, bitwise operators,
type conversions and standard library functions. For
each operator there may be several data flow com-
ponents for different representations and for differ-
ent compile-time constant operands. There are far
too many components to show here, but a few of
the more interesting examples are described below.
In each case A and B denote variables whose values
are not known statically, and x and y are integers
used to denote unspecified parts of a compile-time
constant, e.g., 2x denotes any integer that is a power
of 2. (These values are part of the component defini-
tion, not necessarily the expression.)
Figure 4: Library component for modulus expression
‘A % B’ using sign-and-magnitude representation.
For instance, Figure 4 shows the component for
sign-and-magnitude representation of the modulus
operator. In this case the magnitude of the result (at
the bottom of the figure) is affected by the magnitudes
of both operands, but the sign of the result is affected
only by the sign of the first operand. Thus, this oper-
ation would successfully downgrade an expression in
which only the value of the second operand’s sign was
classified.
Figure 5: Library component for addition ‘A + B’ us-
ing binary representation.
Figure 6: Library component for unsigned integer di-
vision ‘A / 2x’, where x is 3, using binary represen-
tation.
Figure 7: Library component for bitwise conjunction
‘A & x’, where constant x’s value has the bit pattern
shown on the right, using binary representation.
A more complex component is for the binary rep-
resentation of integer addition, as shown in Figure 5.
In this case each input bit affects all outputs of equal
or higher significance, because the addition of any two
bits may cause a carry.
The component in Figure 6 models a special case of
unsigned integer division in which the second operand
is a compile-time constant and a power of 2. In effect,
this operation is equivalent to a right shift, ‘A >> x’,
so it may downgrade input A by removing its right-
most x bits. (This particular component does not
apply to signed values.)
Obvious cases of downgrading often occur with bit-
wise operations. For instance, Figure 7 shows the
result of performing a logical ‘and’ operation on a
byte A and a compile-time constant bit pattern. In
this case bits in A that correspond to zeros in the
second operand are downgraded.
A less-obvious example is the less-than-or-equal
comparison in Figure 8. In this case the second
operand is a constant whose value can be expressed
in the form 2x − 1. Since the x least-significant bits
of the first operand A cannot sum to more than 2x−1
they cannot influence the result and hence are effec-
tively downgraded.
Many components have no data flow from their in-
put(s) to their outputs at all. Most notably, the value
of expressions that produce a constant value do not
Figure 8: Library component for integer comparison
‘A <= 2x − 1’ using binary representation.
Figure 9: Library component for type conversion
‘(T)A’, where target type T has a greater range than
that of signed integer A, using binary representation.
reveal anything about the values of their operands.
Some examples include ‘A * 0’, ‘A % 1’, ‘A == A’ and
‘B >= x’ where B is an m-bit two’s complement inte-
ger and x is the minimum such value −2m−1. The
library also contains components modelling the be-
haviour of expressions involving the special C floating
point value ‘not a number’, many of which also return
constant results.
Finally, not all operators of security relevance in
the library involve blocking data. In a few instances,
such as that shown in Figure 9, classified data may
be duplicated. In this case a signed integer is cast to
a type with a larger range (e.g., ‘short’ to ‘long’) in
which case sign extension is applied and the sign bit
is copied multiple times.
4 Expression tracing functions
Having defined the library of data flow components,
the second challenge was to use them in the data flow
graphs generated for embedded C code expressions by
the C-to-SIFA Converter. In this section we explain
how this tool was extended, including the algorithms
for selecting library components and for connecting
them together.
4.1 Rationale
As mentioned previously, we developed the C-to-SIFA
Converter to support the work of AISEP security
evaluators (Mills et al. 2012). The tool automates
the creation of data flow graphs for embedded soft-
ware, taking embedded C source code as input, and
constructing a data flow graph in a format readable
by SIFA (McComb & Wildman 2005). The tool itself
is written in C] 3.0 and targets embedded C code that
compiles under the CCS compiler.
At the start of this research the C-to-SIFA Con-
verter followed the lead of other secure data flow
analysis systems and treated expression operators as
atomic, resulting in false-positive errors, i.e., connec-
tions through the graph in situations where a more
detailed analysis would show that there is no data
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+ ModelNodeInputs(node : Node) : Representation[]
+ ModelNodeOutput(node : Node) : Representation
– ModelPortsAndType(ports : Port[], type : TypeNode) : Representation
RepresentationBuilder
Representation
# Representation(ports : Ports[], type : TypeNode)
# Representation(type : TypeNode)
+ AddToNodeInputs(node : Node)
+ AddToNodeOutputs(node : Node)
+ CompareRepresentations(a : Type, b : Type) : int
+ CompareTo(representation : Representation) : int
+ Connect(representation : Representation)
+ GetPort(index : uint) : Port
+ GetPortForBit(bit : uint) : Port
# GetPortIndexForBit(bit : uint) : uint
+ IsConnectedTo(representation : Representation) : bool
+ NumberOfBits : uint
+ NumberOfPorts : uint
# Ports : Port[]
# Type : TypeNode
Node
BinaryRepresentation
SignAndMagnitudeRepresentation
SingleValueRepresentation
AdditionComponentSet
BitwiseANDComponentSet
BitwiseORComponentSet
BitwiseXORComponentSet
...
Figure 10: Classes developed to implement the expression tracing functionality.
flow. Our new expression tracing functionality aimed
to resolve this issue by replacing atomic components
with more accurate ones sourced from the component
library.
Being an extension to the existing C-to-SIFA Con-
verter, the expression tracing functionality was also
written in C] 3.0. The set of classes and methods
developed is shown in Figure 10. To help guaran-
tee the program’s correctness, test-driven develop-
ment was utilised, with the final test suite containing
125 unit tests. The ReplaceNode() method of the
ComponentsController class acts as the interface to
the expression tracing tracing functionality, taking a
Node from the data flow graph (an abstraction of a
SIFA component) and replacing it with a more accu-
rate one sourced from the component library. This
process can be divided into two distinct stages: se-
lection of the replacement, and replacing the existing
Node. Detailed discussions of these two stages are
provided in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively.
4.2 Representations
Representations are modelled in the expression trac-
ing functionality by the abstract Representation
class and its subclasses. Methods are provided
to, among other things, retrieve the Port rep-
resenting a particular bit and connect arbitrary
Representation instances. Each subclass imple-
ments the protected GetPortIndexForBit() method
which effectively provides the “subclass-specific” logic
used in the aforementioned functions. Three sub-
classes are defined in the expression tracing function-
ality:
• BinaryRepresentation where each each bit is
mapped to its own port,
• SignAndMagnitudeRepresentation where the
sign bit is mapped to its own port, and all other
bits (the magnitude) are mapped to another, and
• SingleValueRepresentation where all bits are
mapped to a single port.
A Representation instance can be created in one
of two ways: it may be instructed to create its own
Port array, or it can use an array sourced from an ex-
isting Node. The former method is used when creating
a new Node, while the latter is used when creating a
Representation for an existing one. Each subclass
implements constructors for both of these methods so
that they may calculate the number of required ports
or validate those that were given.
Making use of the second method is the
RepresentationBuilder class which provides func-
tions to create Representation instances mod-
elling input or output ports of an existing Node,
ModelNodeInputs() and ModelNodeOutputs(). As
a component may have several logical inputs, the for-
mer method returns an array, while the latter returns
a single object. This functionality is used extensively
when replacing Nodes, with Representations being
built for all parents and children, and then connected
to the new Node using Representation.Connect().
The RepresentationBuilder functions work by
firstly identifying all subclasses of Representation
that could validly be used at this point in the data
flow graph, as per the principles in Section 3.4 above,
and by then selecting the most precise representation
available.
4.3 Component selection
The ComponentSet class hierarchy is the result of
translating the component library to code, with each
subclass representing a logically related group of com-
ponents. These components may be accessed by call-
ing the GetComponentForNode() method which re-
turns the most suitable replacement for the given
Node, or null if none are available. To find all
potential replacements for a particular Node, this
method is firstly called on all ComponentSet sub-
classes. This design was chosen as it allows log-
ically related components to be grouped together
in the code, but leaves the nature of that re-
lation up to the developer. In the expression
tracing functionality, components are grouped by
(a) (b)
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Figure 11: Data flow through expression (A & B) << 4 modelled using different representations.
the expression elements that they model, resulting
in subclasses such as AdditionComponentSet and
BitwiseANDComponentSet. As intra-component con-
nections may not be set on instances of the base code’s
Node class—it assumes that all input ports are con-
nected to all output ports—replacement components
are constructed using its ExpressionNode subclass.
The ComponentSet class offers a number of
“helper” methods to support the creation of re-
placement components in its subclasses. One such
method is RepresentationAllowed() which returns
a boolean value indicating whether the replacement
component may use the given Representation, en-
forcing the constraint on connections from less- to
more-precise representations as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.4. However, this method differs slightly from
the original definition when the Node that is to be
replaced has multiple parents with varying output
representations. In this situation, the replacement
component may use the most-precise of the parents’
output representations to ensure that removal of that
parent’s data is recognised.
This is demonstrated in Figure 11 where the
bitwise and component uses (a) the most-precise
of the parents’ output representations (binary) and
the four most-significant bits of B are removed,
as opposed to (b) the least-precise representation
(single value) where this removal is not recog-
nised. The GetMaximumRepresentation() method
calculates and returns the most-precise of the par-
ents’ output representations, or simply returns
BinaryRepresentation when there are no parents.
Once the set of potential replacement components
has been compiled, the best of these must be selected.
As the goal of this research is to better recognise ex-
pressions that remove data, the best component is
the one that removes the greatest percentage of its
input ports. Percentage removed is used over number
removed as the significance of a single port varies be-
tween representations; it is better to remove a port in
single value representation than in binary representa-
tion. This process is aided by the Component class’s
implementation of the IComparable<Component> in-
terface, allowing the potential replacements to be
sorted by percentage of input ports removed. Should
multiple components remove the same percentage of
their input ports, the component with the most-
precise representation is chosen.
Unlike entries in the component library, compo-
nents constructed by ComponentSet subclasses in-
clude ports for literal value inputs. These ports
are not involved in any intra-component connections,
however, making the components effectively equal to
those of the component library. This approach was
taken as the C-to-SIFA Converter’s base code already
inserts literal value nodes into the data flow graph,
and it allows for the future addition of an option to
trace literal values of interest, i.e., “magic numbers.”
As the component selection algorithm is affected
by the output representations of a node’s parents, the
order in which nodes are replaced is significant. If
a child node is replaced before its parent, the most
appropriate component may not be selected as the
parent’s output will be in single value representation.
To ensure that the most appropriate components are
used throughout the entire data flow graph, replace-
ment should start at nodes without parents (e.g., lit-
eral value nodes or those for the rand() function)
and follow on those encountered while performing a
breadth-first graph traversal from the same node.
4.4 Component replacement
Once an appropriate replacement has been found,
the existing Node must be removed from the data
flow graph and its replacement inserted. This
is a two step procedure. First, all connec-
tions involving the existing Node are mirrored with
its replacement. Supporting this process is the
RepresentationBuilder class which provides meth-
ods to construct Representation instances for exist-
ing Nodes and thus allows them to be connected, as
was discussed in Section 4.2. The second step is to
sever all connections to the existing Node, removing
it from the data flow graph.
(a)
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Figure 12: Data flow graph for expression ‘rand() & 0x0F’ in (a) the original and (b) the updated tool.
5 Evaluation
In this section we demonstrate the effectiveness of
our extension to the C-to-SIFA Converter’s expres-
sion modelling functionality on some small case stud-
ies involving expressions or program segments cited
in other works or that the tool was known to have
difficulty with. If the updated version of the tool ar-
rives at the same conclusion as the previous works or
overcomes the difficulties it previously faced, it can be
said to have greater accuracy and will result in fewer
false-positives.
For each case study, an equivalent C program was
developed and passed to both the original and up-
dated versions of the C-to-SIFA Converter. The re-
sulting data flow graphs were opened in SIFA and
analysed using its “find all paths” function which
enumerates all paths between selected “source” and
“sink” ports. If a path exists between two ports, data
is assumed to flow between them. In the SIFA screen-
shots in Figures 12 to 14 the source and sink ports
appear in red and black, respectively, as is customary
in the infosec community.
5.1 Case study: Masking using bitwise ‘and’
After introducing the concept of influence, Newsome
et al. (2009) provide several examples to demonstrate
its behaviour and use. One such example is the as-
signment ‘V = base + (I & 0x0F)’, for which the
authors conclude that variable I has 4 bits of influence
over variable V. This example demonstrates that the
expression’s bitwise and operation removes all but
the 4 least-significant bits of I.
Our C program mirroring this example performs
the same masking operation, but instead uses the out-
put of the rand() function because the value of I in
the expression is unknown. As can be seen at the
top of Figure 12, the original version of the C-to-
SIFA Converter treated the bitwise and operation as
atomic. When SIFA was used to analyse data flow
it merely reported that the rand() function’s value
affected the expression’s output. The updated tool,
however, recognised that a bitwise component could
be used in this situation. As shown at the bottom of
Figure 12, it expanded the values into binary repre-
sentation and arrived at the same conclusion as New-
some et al. (2009), with SIFA now reporting that only
the 4 least-significant bits of rand() pass through the
bitwise and operation. The more detailed data flow
graph thus allows us to see which parts of the value
are effectively blocked.
5.2 Case study: Dropping bits via integer di-
vision
Another example of influence provided by Newsome
et al. (2009) is the assignment ‘V = I / 2’, for which
the authors conclude that variable I has control over
all but the most-significant bit of variable V. This ex-
ample demonstrates that division by 2x for x ≥ 0 is
equivalent to a right-shift by x places. In this case, x
equals 1.
(a)
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Figure 13: Data flow graph for expression ‘rand() / 2’ in (a) the original and (b) the updated tool.
The C program used to mirror this example per-
forms the same division operation but again on the
value of the rand() function, for the same reasons
as in the previous case study. As can be seen at
the top of Figure 13, the previous version of the tool
again treats the operation as atomic and SIFA merely
reports that the rand() function’s value affects the
whole expression’s value. However, the bottom of Fig-
ure 13 shows that our extended C-to-SIFA Converter
again expanded the values into a binary representa-
tion, and inserted an appropriate division component,
allowing SIFA’s data flow analysis to recognise that
the least-significant bit of the value produced by the
rand() function is removed by the division operation.
Again this accords with the assessment of this expres-
sion by Newsome et al. (2009).
5.3 Case study: Ineffective bits in a compar-
ison
To help us understand how the C-to-SIFA Converter
could be used by AISEP security evaluators, the De-
fence Signals Directorate provided this project with a
package of code fragments intended to be representa-
tive of the sort of embedded C code they encounter
during their evaluations. One of these code frag-
ments contains the expression ‘source reg > 0x7F’
which effectively removes the 7 least-significant bits of
source reg as they alone cannot make the value ex-
ceed 0x7F (127); it is the most significant bit that de-
termines the expression’s output. This demonstrates
that relational operators may be used to downgrade
data similarly to bitwise operators.
Again, the C program used to mirror this example
uses the rand() standard library function in place of
the unknown value source reg. Once more the top
of Figure 14 shows that the previous version of the
tool treats the greater-than operation as atomic and
provides no detail about how data flows through it.
However, the bottom of Figure 14 shows how the up-
dated tool expands the values into binary representa-
tion and correctly removes the 7 least-significant bits
of rand(), allowing only the most-significant bit to
pass through.
6 Discussion and future work
This research project was time-constrained, so we did
not attempt to create library components for all of
those expression elements supported by the CCS com-
(a)
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Figure 14: Data flow graph for expression ‘rand() > 0x7F’ in (a) the original and (b) the updated tool.
piler. Instead we considered certain bitwise, logical,
and mathematical operators, as well as a subset of
standard C library functions and type casts, that were
found in the package of code fragments provided to
the project by the Defence Signals Directorate as rep-
resentative of the sort of embedded C code encoun-
tered during infosec evaluations
The accuracy of the new expression tracing func-
tionality could be further increased by creating sup-
port for more expression elements such as operations
that involve the special floating-point values Inf (in-
finity) and NaN (not a number). Better type cast sup-
port would be particularly beneficial as such opera-
tions are used frequently within embedded code and
can potentially remove significant amounts of data.
While adding support for expression elements in-
creases the tool’s accuracy directly, adding represen-
tations does so indirectly as it facilitates the creation
of components. Several other representations were
contemplated during the development of the com-
ponent library, but were not considered important
enough to implement given the ‘typical’ code frag-
ments provided by the DSD. They include:
• byte representation where groups of 8 bits are
represented by a single port,
• sign, mantissa, and exponent representation
where bits are grouped based on how floating-
point values are stored in memory (e.g., as per
the IEEE 754 standard), and
• sign, integral portion, and fractional portion rep-
resentation (but we cannot determine which bits
comprise these portions without knowing the
value).
A nontrivial undertaking that could significantly
increase the tool’s accuracy would be to implement
some symbolic execution functionality, e.g., by associ-
ating additional metadata with the data values being
traced through components. For example, after data
flows through a left-shift by x, we know that its x
least-significant bits are 0; this would allow more ap-
propriate components to be used later in the data flow
graph, further reducing false-positive errors. This
functionality could be implemented by developing an
abstraction of data to which information can be at-
tached, and then doing so as data is traced through
the data flow graph.
Finally, the expression tracing extension to the
C-to-SIFA Converter was constrained in some ways
by the tool’s existing code base. Data could not be
traced through type casts, for example, because the
extensions works by replacing nodes of a given data
flow graph constructed by the base code, and the ver-
sion of the C-to-SIFA Converter used in this project
did not insert nodes for type casts. (The C-to-SIFA
Converter is still being refined, however, so such a
capability could be added later.)
7 Conclusion
In this research we have developed a technique to
precisely trace data flow through embedded program
expressions and used it to reduce the overestima-
tion of data flow made by an existing static-analysis
toolkit intended for evaluating security-critical pro-
gram code. Small case studies such as those shown
above have demonstrated that the enhanced toolkit
is more accurate and generates fewer false-positive er-
rors through the increased recognition of downgrad-
ing expressions (Li & Zdancewic 2005). This has the
potential to save time and effort for information secu-
rity evaluators of embedded devices. At the time of
writing we are conducting larger case studies (Mills
et al. 2012) and further expanding the capabilities of
the toolkit. As noted above, there are also a number
of ways in which the expression tracing functionality
described herein could be improved even further.
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